Research Question: To what extent was the Battle of the Somme in 1916 considered a Victory for the Allied Forces?
Topic Choice
I really enjoyed learning about World War I during my time at primary school. We learned about the causes of the war, as well as the Schlieffen Plan. I was fascinated by these topics and wanted to explore more about the Great War, so I read quite a few books on this era of history. During my reading, I came across the Battle of the Somme, being described as ‘one of the bloodiest battles in human history’. The vivid descriptions of how soldiers suffered on the Somme became entrenched within my memory, and the primary imagery I associate with WW1. However, I was very puzzled by the outcome of this particular battle, where so many soldiers lost their lives, because different sources had different perspectives. Some claimed it to be a costly Allied victory, while others claimed the battle to be a stalemate, and even a ‘disastrous Allied failure’. Thus I would like to resolve the mystery through my own research on the topic, and determine for myself if the battle was justified for its high casualties.
Context
Much of World War I revolved around trench warfare between the Allied and the German forces. Both sides had dug deep trenches in Eastern France (aka the Western Front in WW1) and they attempted to break the other side’s position. They did this by first bombing enemy defences with artillery fire, and then sending infantry ‘over the top’ to capture enemy trenches. Such tactics usually resulted in a stalemate, where neither side gained any significant advantages due to the fact that it was easier to defend than capture trenches. In December 1915, the Allied High Command planned a major 1916 offensive on the River Somme in northern France to break this stalemate, but their plans were disrupted. On 21st February 1916, German forces went on a large offensive in northeastern France known as the Battle of Verdun, which forced French commanders to divert many of the divisions intended for the Somme to Verdun. As a result, the British Army, which was supposed to be a ‘supporting force’, became the primary effort for the Somme Offensive.
British General Sir Douglas Haig intended the Somme Offensive as a way of diverting German forces from Verdun, as well as a major effort to hasten an Allied victory. His plan was the conventional method of trench warfare, albeit it would be performed on an unprecedentedly large scale. However, General Haig’s “Great Push Forward” did not go according to plan, as German forces successfully defended their positions for the majority of the battle. The inexperience of his army (mostly made of volunteers) and Haig’s gross underestimate of German forces meant that the Allied forces suffered huge casualties for little gain. The slowly-advancing infantry, thinking that most Germans were killed by the preceding artillery bombardment, were easily mowed down by machine gun fire. Indeed, the first day alone saw 40,000 British soldiers injured and 20,000 killed, making it the worst casualty rate for a single day in the history of the British Army.
The Battle of the Somme lasted 140 days, from 1st July 1916 to 18th November 1916. The majority of it consisted of a stalemate where neither side gained an advantage. The battle became the focal point of the Western front, with the British drawing troops from its colonies to replenish their force on the Somme. It was also the first time that airplanes and tanks were used in battle, though they were mostly unreliable. At the end of the Battle, Allied forces merely gained 10km on the front, and the objectives of the first day were not even met. The Somme Offensive was stopped due to the terrible weather from November 1916, as well as the German forces’ strategic decision to retreat to the more easily-defendable Hindenburg Line (which was 40km east of the Somme).
More than three million soldiers participated in the Battle of the Somme, and about one million men were wounded or killed in just five months of fighting. This horrifying fact established the Battle as one of deadliest battles in the whole of human history.
Argument Outline
There had been considerable debate on whether the Battle of the Somme can be considered an Allied victory. Most sources suggest that the battle was a stalemate, as neither side gained significant advantages and both had suffered extremely high casualties. Thus, one way of analysing the outcome of the Somme Offensive was by comparing the amount of casualties. This method proved to be unreliable as those figures vary in different sources. Winston Churchill, with others, suggested that Allied casualties had exceeded German losses. In this manner, it was a defeat for the Allies. However, Churchill also suggests that these figures are actually misleading: the majority of Allied forces on the Somme were inexperienced volunteers, while the German forces were primarily elite veterans. This meant that the Allied losses were actually less significant and German soldiers ‘never fought as well’ as they did on the Somme again. As such, the attrition comparison could be seen as an Allied victory.
Another perspective for examining the outcome of the battle was through the Allied objectives of the Somme Offensive. There were three: to distract German forces from Verdun, to capture Peronne and Bapaume, and to inflict as much damage to German forces as possible. The first objective was reached, as the Somme Offensive did relieve pressure on the French forces at Verdun, and ultimately led to a French victory there. However, the second objective was far from achieved, as the British forces had penetrated a mere 10 km into the front by the end of the battle. However, some claimed that the Germans’ retreat to the Hindenburg Line ultimately meant that Peronne and Bapaume were freely given to the Allied forces and this objective was achieved. But note that the German retreat was a strategic one, and the German voluntarily abandoned their positions on the Somme. On this objective, then, the Somme could be considered a German defensive victory. The third objective is difficult to assess, as the German did suffer very high casualties, but at a lower rate than Allied forces, and this goes back to the comparison on attrition made in the previous paragraph.
Research Process
In order to determine to what extent the Battle of the Somme was an Allied victory, I set out to find sources on the subject. In particular, I read books and used some articles from the internet. Most of the information about the Somme are British sources, but I wanted to have a variety of different perspectives, especially because French and German accounts are so scarce. Thus, I searched up articles about the Somme written in French and German (then translated them), not only because they offered unique perspectives, but they also explained why such an important battle is so absent in those two countries’ culture of remembrance.
I hope that these sources, as well as my own interpretations of the battle, will be integrated in constructing my arguments. I have divided my findings into two parts: how the Somme Offensive was a British disaster in terms of both failing original objectives, and the unjustified high casualties. I would also have a counterargument on how, to a small extent, the battle did have some positive outcome for the Allies on the Western Front after 1916.
Research Hypothesis
To a large extent, the Battle of the Somme cannot be considered an Allied victory, but rather it was a complete disaster on their behalf. Specifically, Allied casualties significantly exceeded German losses during the Battle, and they had also failed to capture the physical objectives set out at the beginning of the campaign. Moreover, these failures can be attributed to the Allies’ gross underestimation of German defences and the British generals’ overconfidence. Thus it was the Allies’ own fault, rather than external factors, that led to their inability to succeed on the Somme. Nevertheless, there were some positive outcomes for the Allies in the aftermath of the Battle, such as ensuring victory at the Battle of Verdun and inflicting lasting damage on the German Army.
Process of Findings
In order to answer the question “To what extent was the Battle of the Somme in 1916 considered a victory for the Allied Forces?”, one must consider the intentions and objectives of the Somme Offensive. In particular, the comparison on the amount of casualties, the achievement of physical objectives, and strategic outcomes of the Battle need to be analysed.
Part I: War of Attrition - Comparing Casualties
Attrition warfare is defined as a military strategy that attempts to win a battle by wearing down the enemy to the point of collapse due to lack of manpower and resources. It was a logical approach for both sides during World War I, as they were stuck in a stalemate of static defensive trenches and attrition was the only way to gain an advantage. The Somme Offensive was no exception to the tactics of attrition, as the British aimed to inflict as many casualties as possible on the Germans in order to divert their troops supplies from the Battle of Verdun (Moorhouse, n.d.). This was done through continuous artillery bombardments and repeated large-scale infantry offensives on German trenches. This tactic was not very effective, as much of the unprotected infantry were decimated by German machine guns while attempting to cross no man’s land (Gilbert, 2006). This led to heavy losses for the Allies for virtually no significant gains (Das Gupta, 2016).
The Allies’ failure on Somme can be clearly illustrated in the first day of the Somme Offensive. As mentioned, it was the worst casualty rate suffered by the British Army. Out of the 140,000 soldiers that went ‘over the top’, 40,000 were wounded and 20,000 died (Gauron, 2016). For perspective, about the same number of soldiers landed on D-Day during World War II, but the Allies only suffered 10,000 casualties, which was six times less than the casualties on the Somme (Woolf, 2016). The Somme’s attrition rate of almost 50% meant that General Haig lost half of his infantry on that day alone. There were only 8,000 German casualties, meaning for every German who fell there were seven Britons who met the same fate (Das Gupta, 2016). Moreover, in the first hour of the campaign, British losses were estimated at 3,000 per minute, or 50 per second (Gauron, 2016). These unbelievable statistics showed that the Somme Offensive was without a doubt a complete catastrophe for the Allies. Indeed, the number of victims was so shocking that General Haig sometimes passed on incorrect figures to the government in London in order to avoid criticism and public discomfort (Churchill, 1931; Das Gupta, 2016).
As the Battle progressed, the same story was repeated throughout the Somme Valley, just at different times and different locations (Moorhouse, n.d.). Although the Allied Forces initiated smaller offensives and as such had less and less casualties (Roberts, 2016), they still suffered immense losses compared to the Germans. This can be seen in the chart below, which shows the total number of casualties by country at the end of the Battle. It is clear that the Allied Forces (including Britain, France, and British colonies) had suffered approximately 150,000 more casualties than the Germans. Other sources vary on the exact amount of casualties, but they all confirmed that the Germans had significantly less casualties than the Allies (Churchill, 1931; Gauron, 2016; Gilbert, 2006; Moorhouse, n.d.). In fact, the Battle of the Somme left the British and French forces weaker in relation to the Germans compared to when the campaign began (Churchill, 1931). This meant that the Allies’ strategy of attrition had totally backfired, and was hurting themselves more than they were hurting the Germans. They were losing more men at a faster rate than the Germans, which directly contradicts their objective of making the Germans suffer more casualties. Moreover, the introduction of the first tanks by the British in September 1916 did inflict much damage on the Germans (Churchill, 1931), yet the fact that German forces still had less losses even without tanks (Gauron, 2016) further reinforces that the Battle of the Somme was indeed a numerical catastrophe for the Allies.
Part II: Physical Objectives
According to Allied High Command, the initial objectives of the Somme Offensive was to capture the German front lines and advance towards Bapaume and Peronne (Moorhouse, n.d.). These two locations were chosen, as they were strategic positions at the intersection of transport roads, and the Allied High Command believed them to be achievable and acceptable physical goals for the Offensive. In reality, the disastrous first day of the campaign saw almost no gain for the British and barely any advancement for the French. This was due to fierce defence from the Germans, and the failure of the Offensive to penetrate the front lines. Even parts of the German trenches that were captured were immediately yielded back to the Germans before the day ended. Moreover, the Allied forces significantly outnumbered German defenders on that day (Churchill, 1931). The fact that they accomplished none of their physical objectives, even with their numerical advantage, is a clear indication of failure.
With the help of tanks and better strategies (Churchill, 1931), the Allies were able to make some progress towards their physical objectives. When the Battle ended in November, the Allies only advanced 12 kilometers from where they started (Gauron, 2016), with their initial destinations of Bapaume and Peronne still out of reach (see map below). The fact that the objectives of the first day were still not achieved after five months of fighting is simply pathetic, considering the huge amount of casualties. Indeed, for every mile gained, the Allies suffered 125,000 casualties (Moorhouse, n.d.), and this huge loss cannot justify the meagre progress they actually made. As such, the Battle of the Somme is definitely an Allied disaster.
Some might argue that the Germans’ retreat in March 1917 meant that the Allies did gain the positions of Bapaume and Peronne, and therefore they did achieve their objectives. However, the Germans’ retreat was actually a strategic one (Kellerhoff, 2016), as their new position on the Hindenburg Line was easier to defend. Moreover, they practiced a ‘scorched earth’ strategy while retreating, destroying their old trenches so that the Allies could not use them (Kellerhoff, 2016). This meant that the Allies’ new gain of territory was not freely given, thus the Somme cannot be considered as an Allied victory in terms of physical objectives.
Part III: Pride & Prejudice
Perhaps one of the most significant causes of the Allies’ failure was their arrogance and their gross underestimation of their enemy. They believed it would be an easy victory based on their numerical superiority, and their overconfidence was shown numerous strategic blunders in their preparations and their questionable tactics in the battle. Firstly, their uncamouflaged preparations for the battle was clearly visible to the Germans, who knew that a large offensive was imminent (Churchill, 1931). Thus the Germans dug deep trenches and set up machine gun posts well in advance. Not only had the Allies’ element of surprise evaporated, but even General Haig himself admitted that they were facing “undoubtedly the strongest and most perfectly defended position in the world” (Churchill, 1931).
Secondly, the generals of the Allied High Command were guilty of military incompetence, as they ordered their soldiers to simply move forward at walking pace and disregard the basic principles of fire and maneuver (Woolf, 2016), since they believed there would be only light resistance from the surviving Germans (after the artillery bombardment). This clearly highlights their supreme arrogance, and a main reason for the Offensive’s failure. They also made other planning errors, such as targeting the Germans’ second and third lines in addition to their front line (Wellington, 2016). This doubled the target area of the artillery, and made their impacts less significant as the shells were scattered instead of concentrated. It is thus no surprise that General Haig was called “the Butcher of the Somme” (Roberts, 2016), and his poor judgements were accused of being a callous disregard of life (Woolf, 2016).
Thirdly, the Allied artillery bombardment prior to the infantry assault failed miserably, as they did not serve their intended purpose of obliterating the German defence (Churchill, 1931). In fact, a large percentage of shells were faulty and actually failed to explode at all (Roberts, 2016). It was believed that these duds were the product of overworked American subcontractors and gross negligence from the War Office Quality Control in Britain (Roberts, 2016). Moreover, two thirds of the shells used were anti-personnel shrapnel shells, which were good for injuring soldiers, but completely useless in destroying trench infrastructures (Wellington, 2016). This meant that the barbed wires and machine gun posts of the German defence were still perfectly intact when the Allied assault began (Woolf, 2016). Moreover, the Allied Forces had underestimated the depth of the German trenches, as most German soldiers survived the artillery bombing in deep dugouts (Gauron, 2016). This was also because the artillery lifted too soon and did not provide cover for the Allied infantry, allowing the Germans to rush out of their bunkers and man their machine guns before the British could cross no-man’s land (Woolf, 2016).
Nevertheless, the British assumed that their bombardment was successful, and thought it would be “easier than drinking tea” to capture the obliterated German trenches (Das Gupta, 2016). This was due to the fact that the German trenches were silent during and after the bombardment, which led the Allies to believe their enemies had been killed. Indeed, some regiments even ordered the soldiers to carry their full equipment while marching through no man’s land, which significantly slowed them down and made them easy targets for the Germans (Roberts, 2016). This overconfidence, together with the inexperience of the majority of British soldiers (because they were mostly volunteers), meant that the Somme Offensive was doomed to fail from the beginning.
Counter Argument
Part IV: Helping Verdun
Despite the fact that the Allies’ Somme Offensive was a complete disaster, some of the consequences of the Battle turned in favour of the Allied Forces. For example, one of the core reasons in initiating the Somme Offensive was to divert German resources from the Battle of Verdun (Moorhouse, n.d.), through inflicting as many casualties on the Germans as possible. This German Offensive at Verdun was meant to capture the strategic forts there, and thereby threaten Paris. Verdun was close to being taken prior to July 1916 (Moorhouse, n.d.), but the Somme Offensive changed that. The Germans were forced to renew their defenders -- by replacing injured and dead troops with fresh ones from the reserves -- on the Somme (Churchill, 1931), thereby decreasing the amount of attackers they had at Verdun as they were transferred to the Somme. This meant that the Somme Offensive had successfully relieved French pressure at Verdun (Moorhouse, n.d.), and actually the French were able to recapture their lost territories there as a result (Gilbert, 2006). In this manner then, the objective of the Allied Forces at the Somme was achieved, as they did prevent a major French defeat/German victory, which was, according to General Haig in December 1916, “ample compensation” for the sacrifices of all those soldiers who fell at the Battle of the Somme (Strauss, 2014). He meant that the immense casualties on the Somme could be justified, as they helped the French to win the Battle of Verdun. This view, of course, is highly controversial and debatable.
Nevertheless, this strategic importance of the Battle of the Somme does not alter the fact that it was still a catastrophic failure for the Allies. The Somme’s influence on Verdun, though significant in terms of the entire war effort on the Western Front, still cannot justify the unreasonably high casualties suffered on the Somme and the Allies’ failure to reach their physical objectives there. Indeed, Churchill (1931) actually claimed that the Somme in fact “relieved the Germans no less than the French” at Verdun, and therefore the Allies gained no strategic advantage through their Somme Offensive at all. This further reinforces that the Battle of the Somme still cannot be considered an Allied victory.
Part V: Lasting Impacts after 1916
Even though the Allied Forces suffered a higher casualty rate than the Germans, an argument can still be made that the soldiers’ futile deaths were not totally meaningless. Most of the British soldiers that participated in the Somme Offensive were recently-recruited volunteers, who had little to no experience of fighting (Churchill, 1931), and so their loss was of a lesser military significance. In contrast, those German defenders in the same battle were hard-fought veterans (Kellerhoff, 2016). This meant that the German losses were more severe and more significant, as they could not replace their troops in a “like for like” manner (Churchill, 1931). Indeed, the huge German casualties on the Somme had reduced its fearsome Imperial Army to a mere militia after the Battle (Kellerhoff, 2016). However, it must be noted that the British did not intend on using their inexperienced conscripts against German veterans as a strategy: they were the only available troops Britain had at that moment. The Germans, in the same manner, had already had troops stationed at the Somme, who just happened to be their elite veterans, so their loss was inevitable.
Secondly, the Battle of the Somme had inflicted another crucial blow for the Germans: it decimated their morals. While the British were always on the advance and were cheered by their continued capture of territories and prisoners, the Germans found themselves depressed from continuously yielding prisoners to their enemy especially after the introduction of tanks (Churchill, 1931). The order to retreat to the Hindenburg Line, though strategic, was still seen by many German soldiers as an admission of defeat, which significantly lowered their morale (Kellerhoff, 2016). Indeed, the strain of physical and moral strength on the Germans meant that their soldiery was never the same again, and that they never fought as well as they did on the Somme battlefield for the remainder of World War I (Churchill, 1931).
Thirdly, the failure of the Somme Offensive inspired the British soldiers to learn from their mistakes (Roberts, 2016). Those who survived the Somme gained valuable experience on how to properly conduct trench warfare, especially in the case of General Haig who went on to improve his tactics (Roberts, 2016). This led the British to inflict several punishing defeats against the Germans in 1917, which ultimately led to the Germans’ demise in 1918 (Roberts, 2016). In this way, the Battle of the Somme was a blessing in disguise for the Allies, because it forced them to adapt new tactics, and it served as the foundation for their future success in World War I and beyond (Roberts, 2016).
Despite all of these positive aftermaths for the Allies, it must be remembered that these were not the intended purposes of the original Somme Offensive, nor are they direct indicators of an Allied victory. Thus, they cannot justify the initial Allied failures that were directly associated with the Battle of the Somme.
Conclusion
Throughout this paper, it is evident that the Battle of the Somme in 1916 was, to a large extent, an Allied failure and a catastrophic bloodbath for them. Thus, it cannot be considered as an Allied victory through the following three premises: firstly, the carnage on the battlefield left more Allied casualties than German ones, resulting in the backfire of the Allies’ plan of attrition; secondly, the Allies’ disastrous offensive meant that the Somme campaign did not reach any of its initial physical objectives, namely the positions of Bapaume and Peronne; thirdly, the failure of the Somme Offensive were not credited to external factors (such as German bravery and resilience), but rather the Allies’ own faults of overconfidence and gross underestimation of the enemy in their plannings. These factors, coupled with the facts that the Allies had more manpower and superior technologies (such as the tanks), confirms that the Battle of the Somme was not an Allied victory.
However, it has also been mentioned that the Battle had some positive outcomes for the Allies. This is seen in their success of diverting German resources from Verdun, and thereby ensuring that position did not fall to the Germans. Other notable achievements include the reduction of the German Army into a militia, negatively impacting German morale, as well as the gain of valuable experiences for the surviving Allied soldiers. Whilst it is true that these could be arguments that suggest the Somme Offensive was an Allied victory, they are insignificant in magnitude compared to the failures of the Allies, and they are merely unintended byproducts of the original purposes of the Battle. Still, they were significant in contributing to the entire war effort as a whole, and should not be completely disregarded.
The major limitations of this project lie in the fact that the Battle of the Somme happened more than a hundred years ago. This leads to many primary sources on the matter being lost, and my inability to find them and use them in my arguments. Another limitation is that most of the used sources clustered in the year 2016 (the centenary of the Battle), which all had modern views and all regarded the Somme as a disaster for the Allies. This meant that my counter arguments were created from the fragments of different sources instead of an entire source that argues in favour of an Allied victory.
Reflection
The Battle of the Somme was undoubtedly one of the bloodiest battles of World War I, and perhaps even the entire human history. No other battles had such huge casualties in such a short period of time, as 1.2 million soldiers died within four-and-a-half months of fighting. In this manner, the Somme Battlefields resemble the epitome of the futility of warfare, with brave young men needlessly sacrificed for the pathetic gain of a mere few miles of territory. It is therefore no surprise that the British are still haunted by the harrowing death tolls of this Battle, and hold memorial services every year on the first of July (which marked the first day of the Somme Offensive). The French and the Germans hold similar ceremonies for the Battle of Verdun, which for them better symbolises the senselessness of war.
In conducting my research on the Battle of the Somme, I was also shocked at the unbelievable amount of casualties, and the almost ridiculously insignificant outcomes. Just reading the figures sent a chill down my back, and I felt a huge sense of remorse at all the potentials that were wasted with those young men’s lives. I could not help but to feel sympathetic for those who lost family members from the ‘corpse-eating’ Somme. The horrors of this Battle further reinforces that conflicts like the Somme are utterly unnecessary and completely devastating, and must be avoided at all costs. It would be in our best interest, as the leaders of tomorrow, to put an end to current conflicts in hope that one day all warfares will cease and there shall be peace across the whole world.
The project also taught me that human lives are valuable, and should not be disregarded so easily as the Allied generals did on the Somme. I hope that the inhumane tactic of attrition will never be used again, and there will never be another leader to be called a ‘Butcher’.
Apart from the morals I learnt from this project, I also gained valuable experiences in how to conduct research. Specifically, I now know how to properly structure a research paper, and how to cite the sources I used. There were also the problems I encountered, such as finding sources of different perspectives. Instead of looking for English ones that offer a different lens on the Somme Offensive, I resorted to finding articles written in German and French. I did so successfully by using the same search engine with different regions (Google.fr and Google.de), as well as the help of a Translation widget.
Bibliography
Books
Churchill, W. S. (1931). The World Crisis 1911-1918, abr. and rev. edn. London: Thornton & Butterworth, pp. 652-668.
Gilbert, M. (2006). Somme: The Heroism and Horror of War. London: John Murray.
Articles
Das Gupta, O. (2016). 1. Weltkrieg: So schlimm tobte die Somme-Schlacht 1916: „An der leichenfressenden Somme.“ Süddeutsche Zeitung, [online]. Available at:
https://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/weltkrieg-somme-schlacht-1.3255405
[Accessed 23 Feb. 2021].
Kellerhoff, S. F. (2016). Sterben an der Somme: „Zerrissen, in Stücke gehackt, zu Brei gestampft“. Die Welt, [online]. Available at:
https://www.welt.de/geschichte/article157503892/Zerrissen-in-Stuecke-gehackt-zu-Brei-gestampft.html [Accessed 23 Feb. 2021].
Moorhouse, D. (n.d.). Who won the Battle of the Somme? Schoolhistory.org.uk, [online]. Available at:
https://schoolshistory.org.uk/topics/world-history/first-world-war/who-won-the-battle-of-the-somme/ [Accessed 20 Feb. 2021].
Roberts, A. (2016). A Bold New History of the Battle of the Somme. Smithsonian Magazine, [online]. Available at:
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/bold-new-history-battle-somme-180959488/ [Accessed 22 Feb. 2021].
Images
Carnarvon, F. (2016). The Somme. Lady Carnarvon, [online]. Available at:
https://www.ladycarnarvon.com/the-somme/ [Accessed 14 Jun. 2021].
Gauron, R. (2016). La Somme, bataille la plus sanglante de la Grande Guerre. Le Figaro, [online]. Available at:
https://www.lefigaro.fr/histoire/2016/07/01/26001-20160701ARTFIG00017-la-somme-bataille-la-plus-sanglante-de-la-grande-guerre.php [Accessed 21 Feb. 2021].
McCarthy, N. (2016). There were over a million casualties at the Battle of the Somme. Statista, [online]. Available at:
https://www.statista.com/chart/6687/there-were-over-a-million-casualties-at-the-somme/
[Accessed 11 Jun. 2021].
Strauss, E. (2014). Somme’s End. Yale University Press Blog, [online]. Available at:
http://blog.yalebooks.com/2014/11/18/sommes-end/ [Accessed 13 Jun. 2021].
Wellington, J. (2016). CENTENARY: The Somme—the big picture. History Ireland, [online]. Available at:
https://www.historyireland.com/volume-24/centenary-somme-big-picture/
[Accessed 12 Jun. 2021].
Woolf, C. (2016). Why the Battle of the Somme was the bloodiest day in British military history. TheWorld, [online]. Available at:
https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-07-01/why-battle-somme-was-bloodiest-day-british-military-history [Accessed 21 Jun. 2021].
“If ye break faith with us who die / we shall not sleep,
though poppies grow / In Flanders fields.”
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